25. Линн полагает (The Echo of Battle, 239), что это особенно касалось генерала Томми Фрэнкса, командующего Центральным командованием Вооруженных сил США и архитектора вторжения. См. также: Hogan, “Head and Heart,” 1052.
26. Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin, 2009), 8–9; Robert Parry, “Bush’s My Lai,” consortiumnews.com, May 30, 2006, www.consortiumnews.com/2006/052906.html; Christopher Hitchens, “The Hell of a War: Why Haditha isn’t Mai Lai,” Slate, June 5, 2006, www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/fighting_words/2006/06/the_hell_of_war.html.
27. Ricks, The Gamble, 8–9, 12, 14–15, 23.
28. Ricks, The Gamble, 31–57.
29. Laleh Khalili, “The Location of Palestine in Global Counterinsurgencies,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42:3 (2010), 427.
30. Laleh Khalili, “The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency,” Middle East Report (255) (June 7, 2010), http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/8609/.
31. Bacevich, Washington Rules, 186–91.
32. Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871–1914 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58, 62.
33. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, “Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,” Orbis (Spring 2009), 322.
34. Bacevich, Washington Rules, 196–202.
35. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: The Fundamentals of Company Level Counter-insurgency,” Small Wars Journal (March 1, 2006), http:// smallwarsjournal.com/documents/28articles.pdf, article 19.
36. Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s Magazine, February 2007, www.harpers.org/archive/ 2007/02/0081384.
37. Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles.”
38. John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2011), 393, 395, 397–407, 412; о логистике и бригадах «Страйкер», см. стр. 433–37.
39. www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_07.pdf.
40. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 413–21.
41. Ann Scott Tyson, “GAO Faults Military Over Munitions in Iraq,” The Washington Post, March 23, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/03/22/AR2007032202017.html.
42. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 423–33, 439–40.
43. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 441–42.
44. James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford University Press, 2011), 3.
45. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 1–21, 27, 192–95, 207–208.
46. Michiko Kakutani, “The War in Iraq, Second in a Series,” New York Times, February 9, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/books/10kaku.html?pagewanted=all.
47. Эта история приводится в работе: Deborah Amos, Eclipse of the Sunnis: Power, Exile, and Upheaval in the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
48. John Burns and Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” New York Times, June 11, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html?pagewanted=1; Pierre Tristam, “The Sons of Iraq, or Iraqi Awakening: Iraq’s Sunni Variable Insurgency or Conciliation? How the Sunni Awakening Challenges Iraq’s Shiites,” http://middleeast.about.com/od/ iraq/a/me080822.htm.
49. Rachel Schneller, “Do Surges Work?” SAIS Review, 30:1 (Winter — Spring 2010).
50. Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles.”
51. Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 61, 193.
52. Khalili, “The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency.”
53. Комментарии Шнеллер (“Do Surges Work?”) относятся к контексту операции «Атака рыцарей», проведенной при поддержке США в марте 2008 года по расширению правительственного контроля над Басрой.
54. По словам арт-критика газеты New York Times Сета Шизеля, видеодизайнеры намеренно избегают тем, связанных с Ираком и Афганистаном, «потому что общие сюжеты этих конфликтов не кажутся особенно героическими или оправдательными. Общественность понимает, что американские солдаты каждый день совершают акты героизма и храбрости, но, похоже, счастливых концов в недавних войнах Америки пока не предвидится, да и вообще никаких концов не предвидится». “Recruiting the Inner Military Hero in Men Who Don’t Face the Draft,” New York Times, November 16, 2010.
55. Bacevich, Washington Rules, 194.
56. www.cnas.org/people website, дата обращения 16 ноября 2011 г.; Michael Hastings, The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: Blue Rider Press, 2012), 81.
57. Ricks, The Gamble, 21.
58. www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898517,00.html.
59. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 3.
60. Michael Hastings, “The Sins of General David Petraeus,” Buzzfeed Politics, November 11, 2012, www.buzzfeed.com/mhastings/the-sins-of-general-davidpetraeus; Spencer Ackerman, “How I Was Drawn into the Cult of David Petraeus,” Wired, November 11, 2012, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/petraeus-cult-2; Maureen Dowd, “Reputation, Reputation, Reputation,” New York Times, November 14, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/opinion/dowd-reputation-reputation-reputation.html?hp&_r=0. См. также: Paula Broadwell and David Loeb, All In: The Education of David Petraeus (New York: Penguin, 2012).
61. Ricks, The Gamble, 277.
62. “Army Transformation, Implications for the Future.” Заявление генерал-майора Роберта Скейлза, House Armed Services Committee, July 15,2004. Цитируется по: Porter, Military Orientalism, 58.
63. Andrew Munford, Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2011), 8–9, 14.
64. International Crisis Group, Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra, Middle East Report No. 67 (June 25, 2007), 17, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/ 67_iraq___lessons_from_basra.pdf.
65. “UK has Left Behind Murder and Chaos Says Basra Police Chief,” Guardian, December 16, 2007, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/17/iraq.military.
66. Tim Shipman, “British Forces Useless in Basra,” Daily Telegraph, August 19, 2007, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1560713/British-forces-uselessin-Basra-say-officials.html; Ministry of Defence, Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, July 2006, www.vilaweb.cat/media/ attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf, 8–8, 8–10.
67. Munford, Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth, 7.
68. Michael Smith, “British Troops in Secret Truce with the Taliban,” The Times, October 1, 2006; Jason Burke, “Taliban Town Seizure Throws Afghan Policy into Disarray,” Observer, February 3, 2007.
69. Презентация Джона Бью, “Reassessing Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice,” The Robert S. Strauss Center, University of Texas at Austin, June 7–9, 2012.
70. Маневренный подход, лежащий в основе британской доктрины, делал акцент на поиске и уничтожении цели, а не на истощении или сдерживании. Alexander Alderson, “The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq” (PhD dissertation, Cranfield University, UK, November 2009), 261.
71. International Crisis Group, Where Is Iraq Heading, 12–13.
72. Шнеллер также отмечает (“Do Surges Work?”), что к 2005 году в Басре появились особенно смертоносные СВУ на основе ударного ядра, из-за которых поездка по улицам превратилась в самоубийственную авантюру даже для бронированных британских автомобилей.
73. MOD, Operation Banner, 843, 8–11.
74. Bew, “Reassessing Counterinsurgency.”
75. Alderson, “The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq,” 261–69.
76. Huw Bennett, “The Reluctant Pupil? Britain’s Army and Learning in CounterInsurgency,” Royal United Service Institute, www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AD22F8DF284C/.
77. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, “Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,” Orbis (Spring 2009), 322, 333.